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Toward Open Skies: Liberalizing Trade in
International Airline Services*
Daniel C. Hedlund
International air transport services play an important role
in world trade. More than one billion passengers fly every year
and over twenty million tons of cargo are shipped by air annu-
ally.' As businesses further expand their operations interna-
tionally, and the tourism industry continues to grow, air
transport will become an even more crucial part of international
commerce. In order to ensure that the international air trans-
port system is able to meet the needs of international trade and
tourism, the current regime based on the bilateral exchange of
traffic rights2 must be reexamined.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)3 re-
cently sponsored a World-wide Air Transport Colloquium (the
* This Note received the Federal Bar Association's John T. Stewart, Jr.
Memorial Fund Writing Award for 1994.
1. Wolfgang Michalski et al., New Policy Approaches to International Air
Transport: Main Issues and Summary of the Discussion, in INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 7 (Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) 1993).
2. The international air traffic system presently consists of 1,200 different
bilateral agreements that have been negotiated between governments over the
past 50 years. These accords designate landing rights and overflight privileges
for a country's airlines. NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG AND COM-
PETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: CHANGE, CHALLENGE AND COMPETITION 20 (1993)
[hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION REPORT]. This framework is in contrast to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral agreement that applies
the same general rules to all member trading partners. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. For further analysis of GATT and
its possible application to international air transport, see infra notes 216-26
and accompanying text. The bilateral system is viewed by many as time con-
suming, inefficient, and detrimental to the interests of consumers, airports, and
cities by its imposition of regulatory limitations on growth and opportunities in
the air transport sector. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
3. Based in Montreal, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) was created in 1944 at the Chicago Conference and currently consists of
156 member states. JACQUES NAVEAU, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT IN A
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"Colloquium")4 at which over 500 delegates explored the future
of international air transport regulation. The delegates focused
on whether to maintain the current framework of bilateral avia-
tion agreements, or to shift to a multilateral framework. 5 The
Colloquium was part of the ICAO's ongoing preparation for an
Air Transport Conference, to be held in late 1994,6 which will
further address these issues. 7 Although it is unlikely that this
Conference will produce an overhaul of the bilateral regime, the
current crisis faced by the international airlines industry is pro-
pelling the idea of multilateral liberalization forward, particu-
larly in the United States and the European Union (EU).8
In an effort to bolster the U.S. airline industry, which has
lost over ten billion dollars in the past three years, 9 President
Clinton and Congress appointed the National Commission to
Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry (the "U.S. Com-
CHANGING WORLD 49 (1989). It is an arm of the United Nations and its mission
is "to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and
to foster the planning and development of international air transport." Conven-
tion on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 44, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 326 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. A Legal Director
of the International Civil Aviation Organization has described the organization
as having "wide quasi-legislative and executive powers in the technical regula-
tory field, [but] only consultative and advisory functions in the economic
sphere." Michael Milde, The Chicago Convention -After Forty Years, 9 ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 119, 122 (1984).
4. The Colloquium took place in April, 1992, in Montreal. ICAO, Doc. No.
9605, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 33-35 (1992) [hereinafter ICAO ANNUAL
REPORT].
5. Participants also discussed the applicability of international trade con-
cepts, such as market access (defined as access to routes, traffic rights, entry
and national treatment), H.A. Wassenbergh, The Application of International
Trade Principles to Air Transport, 12 AIR L. 84, 88 (1987), and non-discrimina-
tion (also referred to as "most-favored nation" treatment or MFN, which re-
quires a country granting a trade privilege to another country to grant that
same trade privilege to all other countries of similar diplomatic status, see infra
notes 220-26 and accompanying text) to air transport. ICAO ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 4.
6. The conference, entitled "International Air Transport Regulation: Pres-
ent and Future," will take place Nov. 23 through Dec. 6, 1994 - exactly fifty
years after the Chicago Conference. ICAO 1994 Meeting Will Mark 50th Anni-
versary of Chicago Conference, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Apr. 5, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. For a description of the Chicago Confer-
ence, see infra notes 31-55 and accompanying text.
7. ICAO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 34.
8. N.B.: European Union, or EU, will be used throughout this Note to
refer to what was formerly known as the European Community, or EC, in order
to avoid confusion.
9. The War in the Skies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1993, at 66.
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mission") to develop a plan to improve the industry.10 The EU
initiated a similar commission (the "EU Committee of Wise
Men") to review the problems of its own beleaguered airlines in-
dustry1 which posted losses totalling seven billion dollars be-
tween 1990 and 1992.12 The global scope of the industry's crisis
is demonstrated by the fact that the 221 airline members of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) 13 lost 11.5 bil-
lion dollars on international scheduled services alone between
1990 and 1992.14 This is more than all the net profits made by
the industry since international airline services began soon after
World War I. 15
Both the U.S. Commission and the EU Committee of Wise
Men have recommended further liberalization 16 in the trade of
10. The 26-member commission, headed by former Virginia Governor Ger-
ald Baliles, began meeting in May 1993 and after intensive study and numer-
ous hearings submitted their recommendations to the President in August of
the same year. Its members consisted of industry experts from the private and
public sectors, as well as representatives from airline unions and management.
U.S. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ii-2.
11. The Committee of "Wise Men" began conducting hearings in September
of 1993 and is chaired by former Belgian Transport Minister, Herman De Croo.
'Wise Men' Seeking Answers to Europe's Airline Crisis, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File. The EU Com-
mittee of Wise Men released its report in February, 1994, and immediately be-
gan urging the EU to adopt its recommendations as official EU policy.
Committee Recommends Liberalizing Rules for European Airline Industry,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A21 (Feb. 2, 1994).
12. Pierre Sparaco, E.C. 'Wise Men' Debate Airline Crisis Remedies, AVIA.
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 1993, at 28.
13. For a description of IATA, see infra note 60.
14. Paul Betts & David Gardner, Slow Recovery on the Runway: High
Losses and Liberalization Are Forcing Airlines to Restructure, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
1, 1993, at 14.
15. Id. While the primary cause of the industry's decline is debatable,
there is evidence that it is a combination of a worldwide economic slowdown
coupled with overcapacity problems. Arthur Reed, A Taxing Situation, AIR
TRANsP. WORLD, Oct. 1993, at 71. Prior to the Gulf War, air traffic had been
growing at 6 to 7 percent each year. Margareta Pagano, Storm Clouds in Eu-
rope's Open Skies With Brussels Seeking to Increase Competition, Britain's Air-
lines are Blazing the Trail of Profitable Independence from the State, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 7, 1993, at 8. This rise in air traffic encouraged airlines to buy
new planes and acquire additional routes. Unfortunately, the demand for air
transportation was depressed by the Persian Gulf crisis and the recession, id.,
and the combination of events resulted in overcapacity. Reed, supra. During
the period 1990-93, capacity exceeded traffic by 5 percent. Id at 72. Extrapo-
lated worldwide, this was equivalent to 400 empty 747s operating on the New
York-London route every day. Id.
16. Liberalization has been defined as a "policy of gradually lifting restric-
tions imposed upon existing companies so that managements of those compa-
nies can more freely determine their activities in the market." H.A.
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international airline services to help combat the industry's
problems. The U.S. Commission has recommended a shift in the
focus of American policy from bilateral air transport agreements
to a comprehensive multilateral agreement. 17 The U.S. Com-
mission's report states:
The principal challenge for our country is to fashion a new, growth-
oriented international aviation framework that allows U.S. airlines to
use their competitive strength and international air services to realize
their full potential. This goal will require a clear and decisive shift in
policy by the United States away from the present system of bilateral
regulation of air services to one based on multi-national arrangements
that may be regionalized at first, but eventually cover the globe.'
8
Achieving this goal will require great patience, because trading blocs of
similar philosophy have not yet materialized, even in the European
Community. 19
However, the report recently released by the EU Committee
of Wise Men indicates that a similar philosophy is materializing
in the EU. The report recommends the creation of "a liberal
aviation trading regime and in so doing, [to] send a clear signal
to non-European states and air carriers that EU external avia-
tion policy will be consistent and will encourage reciprocal
Wassenbergh, New Aspects of National Aviation Policies and the Future of Air
Transport Regulation, 13 AIR L. 18, 20 (1988). Liberalization should not be con-
fused with deregulation which goes a step further and "free[s] 'a priori' the air
transportation activity as such from all 'a priori' government interference." Id.
These policies are discussed with respect to the experiences of the United
States and the EU infra notes 132-211 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2 at 20-22.
18. The Clinton Administration endorsed most of the U.S. Commission's
recommendations for U.S. international air transport policy in The Clinton Ad-
ministration's Initiative to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry (the
"Clinton Initiative") which was issued Jan. 6, 1994. For a summary of the Clin-
ton Initiative's major provisions regarding international air transport see infra
notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-22. However, the EU is
moving forward with liberalization including laws against subsidies and limits
on capacity, as well as allowing cabotage (the practice of carrying passengers
between two different points in another country by a foreign airline) within the
EU member states. This effort is scheduled to be completed by April 1, 1997.
Karel Van Miert, Vice-President of the EU Air Transport Commission recently
stated, "open markets are here to stay." Karel Van Miert, Address at the Inter-
national Aviation Club (Oct. 8, 1993) (transcript available from the Reuter Eur.
Comm. Rep.). The EU is supporting its commitment to "open markets" and
"competition." In November, 1993, the EU opened an investigation to deter-
mine whether government aid granted to Air France was in violation of EU
competition regulations. E.C. to Investigate Aid to Air France, Agence France
Presse, Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. For fur-
ther explanation of EU liberalization, see infra notes 167-211 and accompany-
ing text.
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growth and expansion of services."20 In addition, the Wise Men
concluded that bilateral agreements "ignore the new realities" of
the Single European Aviation Market.21 These two reports are
evidence that, for the first time, there is the potential for an in-
ter-regional "open skies" 2 2 agreement between the United
States and the EU.
This Note examines the current framework of bilateral
agreements and regulations in the international airline industry
and suggests that the international air transport industry
should move toward a more liberalized "open skies" regime
grounded in a multilateral or inter-regional framework. Such a
development would increase competition among air carriers and
produce lower fares,23 and would help to ensure the continued
expansion of the world's largest industry-travel and tour-
ism. 24 In addition, international liberalization would improve
the financial condition of some airlines by allowing them access
to new markets, and would strengthen the industry as a whole
by increasing consumption of air services. 25
20. Committee Recommends Liberalizing Rules for European Airline Indus-
try, supra note 11. Further, the EU Committee of Wise Men recommended that
multilateral liberalization begin by deregulating air cargo traffic between the
EU and the United States. Id.
21. Wise Men: Bilaterals Ignore 'New Realities' of Single Market, AVIATION
EUR., Feb. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
22. The term "open skies" has been subject to different interpretations, but
generally denotes an agreement that at the minimum includes open entry on
routes, unrestricted capacity and frequency on routes, and unrestricted traffic
rights. In re Defining "Open Skies," D.O.T. Order No. 92-8-13 (Aug. 5, 1992).
In contrast, "closed skies" describes an agreement that is more regulatory and
restricts market access, capacity and frequency. For a recent and more com-
plete definition of "open skies" as defined by the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, see infra note 72.
23. ETHAN WEISMAN, TRADE IN SERVICES AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION: AP-
PLICATION TO INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 3 (1990). See also infra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text.
24. Peter Woodman, Air Policies 'Restricting Growth of Tourism', Press As-
sociation Newsfile, Nov. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
File. The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) recently reported that the
travel and tourism industry accounts for 10.2% of gross domestic product and 1
in 10 jobs. Id. The value of all travel and tourism, including wages, customer
spending, investments, government spending, foreign trade, and business sales,
is expected to rise to about $7.9 trillion by 2005 from an estimated $3.4 trillion
in 1994. Bigger Than Ever, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Nov. 19, 1993, at 5D.
The WTTC recently urged an "open skies" aviation policy and warned that "re-
strictive or protectionist air transport policies could significantly inhibit the
growth and development of travel and tourism." Id. See also infra notes 99-102
and accompanying text.
25. Opening market access would produce more competition, which in turn
would lower fares, and result in more air travel. This occurred in the United
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Part I describes early attempts to conclude multilateral avi-
ation agreements. Part II examines the restrictive bilateral
framework of international aviation agreements, considers past
model agreements, and highlights recent liberal agreements be-
tween the United States and the Netherlands. Part III dis-
cusses the benefits to be gained from further international
aviation liberalization, and the current barriers to achieving
such liberalization. Part IV details internal liberalization
within the United States and the EU, as well as U.S. attempts to
export liberalization. It demonstrates that as the EU continues
with its liberalization plan, its aviation policy is becoming more
similar to that of the United States. Part V considers different
approaches to attain further liberalization of trade in air trans-
port services. The Note concludes that the current system of bi-
lateral aviation agreements has failed to keep pace with the
changing nature of the airline industry, and that the United
States should conclude an inter-regional "open skies" accord
with the EU, which other countries could later join. Finally, the
Note asserts that the recent "open skies" agreement between the
Netherlands and the United States should serve as the model
for such an agreement.
I. MULTILATERAL ATTEMPTS AT AVIATION
LIBERALIZATION
A. THE PARIS CONVENTION
Following World War I, the Peace Conference of 1919 (the
"Paris Conference") produced the Convention Relating to the
Regulation of Aerial Navigation, also known as the Paris Con-
vention.26 The Paris Conference pitted those who believed that
the skies were a collective property owned by all nations27
against those who felt that sovereignty extended from the
ground below up into the sky above it. 2 8 Perhaps as a result of a
new found fear of aviation arising from its lethal and invasive
role in World War I, the national sovereignty advocates pre-
vailed and the Paris Convention recognized that every state has
States following domestic deregulation. See infra notes 132-45 and accompany-
ing text. Also, in Latin America, a regional "open skies" agreement has led to a
400% increase in air travel since 1989. See infra note 242.
26. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13,
1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
27. This was referred to as "res communis" under Roman Law. NAVEAU,
supra note 3, at 25.
28. Id.
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"complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory."29 Thus, while international maritime law had estab-
lished a "free sea" policy,30 the right of states to control all activ-
ity in their airspace was reserved under international aviation
law. This strict view of state sovereignty over airspace has
helped shape the present framework of bilateral aviation
agreements.
B. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
As the international aviation industry expanded, another
conference was called to replace the outdated Paris Conven-
tion.31 Representatives of fifty-two nations attended the Chi-
cago Conference of 1944 on International Civil Aviation and
adopted the Chicago Convention.3 2 The goal of the conference
was to create a multilateral framework for the future growth
and regulation of international aviation. At the time, the United
States was the strongest aviation power and urged the attend-
ing states to adopt a multilateral "open skies" agreement 33 - an
arrangement which clearly would have benefited the dominant
U.S. airlines industry. The United States argued that capaci-
ties,34 frequencies,3 5 and fares should be decided by interna-
tional market forces and not by any regulatory agency. 36
In addition, the United States lobbied for the multilateral
adoption of the "five freedoms" of the sky.3 7 Although only the
first two "technical" freedoms were included in the Chicago Con-
vention,38 the complete list continues to serve as working rules
29. Paris Convention, supra note 26, at 190.
30. Inspired by Hugo Grotius' "free seas" philosophy, maritime law has rec-
ognized the seas as the collective property of all the states. NAVEAU, supra note
3, at 25.
31. EUGENE SOCHOR, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL AvIATION 2-3 (1991).
32. Chicago Convention, supra note 3. See PAUL S. DEMPSEY, LAw & FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 9 (1987).
33. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 10-11.
34. Capacity is the number of available commercial seats on a particular
aircraft multiplied by the frequency of flights on a particular route. Id.
35. Frequency is the number of flights over a particular route usually mea-
sured on a per week basis. Id.
36. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw 11-5 (1972).
37. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 10.
38. Id. at 11. The Chicago Convention was supplemented by the Interna-
tional Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, T.I.A.S. 487,
84 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Transit Agreement]. The transit agreement has
been ratified by almost 100 nations. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 51. An addi-
tional supplement to the Chicago Convention was the International Air Trans-
port Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1701, T.I.A.S. 488, U.N.T.S. 387
[hereinafter Transport Agreement]. The Transport Agreement, in contrast to
1994]
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for bilateral air transport services agreements. The "five free-
doms" can be summarized as follows:
1) A civil aircraft has the right to fly over the territory of another coun-
try without landing, provided the overflown country is notified in ad-
vance and approval is given.
2) A civil aircraft of one country has the right to land in another coun-
try for technical reasons, such as refueling or maintenance, without
offering any commercial service to or from that point.
3) An airline has the right to carry traffic from its country of registry
to another country.
4) An airline has the right to carry traffic from another country to its
own country of registry.
5) An airline has the right to carry traffic between two countries
outside its own country of registry as long as the flight originates or
terminates in its own country of registry. 3
9
The fifth freedom was the most controversial because many Eu-
ropean nations feared that with no limits on capacity, the
stronger U.S. airlines would dominate Europe's limited domestic
aviation markets. 40
While the U.S. proposals received support from the Nether-
lands and the Scandinavian countries, they were not backed by
a majority of the states present at the Chicago Conference. 41
The other states, especially the United Kingdom, were wary that
the more powerful American aviation industry would dominate
the international market in an unregulated free-trade environ-
ment.4 2 With these concerns in mind, the British proposed the
creation of an international aviation organization to coordinate
international air transport.4 3 The organization was to be re-
sponsible for apportioning routes and deciding frequencies and
the Transit Agreement, provides for the multilateral exchange of all five free-
doms of the air. Id. However, fewer than a dozen nations have ratified this
agreement. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 51.
39. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 11. Original text can be found in Transport
Agreement, supra note 38, at 3.
40. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 12.
41. I. H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAw 9, (4th
ed. 1991).
42. RAMON DE MURIAS, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT 46-47 (1989).
43. The British proposed that the "International Air Authority" would: i)
control routes and frequencies, ii) allocate quotas to countries' carriers for serv-
ices on assigned routes, and iii) set rates to avoid waste and get rid of subsidies.
The British believed that this system would allow their war-battered aviation
industry to recover and better compete with the United States. DEMPSEY, supra
note 32, at 11-12.
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tariffs. 44 Several other countries proposed variations on the
American and British models.45
In the end, the participants at the Chicago Conference were
unable to reach agreement on the multilateral exchange of inter-
national air traffic rights.46 While Article 5 of the Chicago Con-
vention allows for the unrestricted operation of international air
services with regard to non-scheduled flights47 (subject to any
regulations of the destination country),48 Article 6 requires "spe-
cial permission or authorization" by any contracting state with
respect to any scheduled international air service that operates
over or into its territory.49 Thus, Article 6 can be viewed as the
starting point for the current restrictive bilateral framework
employed in international air service negotiations, 50 because it
requires an access-seeking country to obtain separate permis-
sion from each state.
Following the Chicago Conference, it was clear that, with
the reaffirmation of airspace sovereignty, any liberalization of
air transport arrangements would have to occur on a bilateral
basis, instead of a multilateral basis.51 The nations attending
the Chicago Conference did agree on a model form for future bi-
lateral agreements. 52 The Form of Standard Agreement for Pro-
visional Air Routes ("Standard Chicago Agreement") was an
outline form leaving details such as capacities and rate-making
44. Id.
45. For example, Canada supported the British model, but proposed an
even more elaborate international regulatory agency. Australia and New Zea-
land proposed the internationalization of the world's airlines under one author-
ity in which all states would participate. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 41,
at 9.
46. DE MURIAS, supra note 42, at 51.
47. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 5. Non-scheduled flights, i.e.
"charter flights," are not carried out according to a published timetable, and are
not subject to the rates and tariffs applicable to regular scheduled air services.
DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 14-16.
48. Chicago Convention, supra note 3, art. 5.
49. Id., art. 6. The distinction between Articles 5 and 6 was made to guar-
antee freedom and flexibility for non-scheduled air traffic. DEMPSEY, supra note
32, at 14-16.
50. H.A. Wassenbergh, Parallels and Differences in the Development of Air,
Sea and Space Law in the Light of Grotius' Heritage, 9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
163, 171 n.16 (1984).
51. Bilateral negotiations require individual governments to meet and ar-
range for their respective country's airlines to gain access to the other country's
market. Typically, the price for such an agreement is a reciprocal promise of
market access for the other country's airlines.
52. DE MuxmAS, supra note 42, at 49.
1994]
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for the particular parties to negotiate.5 3 The United States uti-
lized this form to conclude several Standard Chicago Agree-
ments with other nations.5 4 These early agreements were
typically very liberal, often exchanging all "five freedoms," and
placing no restrictions on capacity or pricing.55 However, it was
the Bermuda I agreement, concluded between the United States
and the United Kingdom in 1946, which would serve as the dom-
inant model for future aviation agreements.5 6
II. THE CURRENT BILATERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
TRADE IN AVIATION RIGHTS
A. THE BERMUDA I AGREEMENT
In 1946, representatives of the United States and the
United Kingdom met in Bermuda where they reconciled some of
their previous differences5 7 and entered into the Air Services
Agreement ("Bermuda I").58 This agreement represented a com-
promise between the two countries' differing views regarding
the proper amount of regulation in international air transport.
The United States retreated from its earlier position that there
be no international regulation of fares5 9 and agreed to allow the
International Air Transport Association (IATA)60 to determine
53. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 52.
54. Id. These nations included Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 53.
57. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
58. Air Services Agreement, Feb. 11, 1946, U.S.-U.I., 60 Stat. 1499 [here-
inafter Bermuda I].
59. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
60. Founded in Havana in 1945, IATA is based in Montreal and has over
150 members. NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 59-64. While the ICAO's membership
consists of nations, IATA's members are the airlines which operate interna-
tional services "under the flag of a state eligible to membership in the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization." Its goals are:
1) to promote safe, regular and economical air transport of the peoples
of the world, to foster air commerce, and to study the problems con-
nected therewith;
2) to provide means for collaboration among the air transport enter-
prises engaged directly or indirectly in international air transport
service;
3) to cooperate with the International Civil Aviation Organization and
other international organizations.
IATA Articles of Association, art. III. From a regulatory standpoint, IATA
works to coordinate tariffs if governments delegate that responsibility to IATA
in bilateral agreements. Market access and capacity remain within the juris-
diction of governments. NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 59-64.
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fares relating to air traffic between the two countries.61 In re-
turn for the U.S. concession allowing some regulation of fares,
the British relaxed their previous demands that there be capac-
ity regulation, especially with regard to fifth-freedom rights
which allow an airline to carry passengers between countries
outside of the airline's home country so long as the flight
originates or terminates in the airline's home country.62
Bermuda I's defining characteristics were its liberal ar-
rangements regarding capacity determination and carrier
designation, and its restrictive delegation of rate-making to
IATA, subject to both countries' approval.63 Between 1946 and
1976, many governments, including the United States and
United Kingdom, utilized the Bermuda I agreement as a model
for their bilateral air transport agreements with other nations. 64
B. THE NETHERLANDS PROTOCOL
In the late 1970s, as it was deregulating its domestic airline
industry, 65 the United States began to work toward deregula-
tion on an international level. This endeavor echoed the earlier
"open skies" stance taken by the United States at the Chicago
Conference in 1944.66 The United States called for "open" bilat-
eral agreements based upon a prohibition of government inter-
vention with fares, except by mutual agreement.67 In 1978, the
United States concluded the first such agreement - the Proto-
col Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport
Agreement. 68 The primary goals of the Netherlands Protocol
are "to promote an international aviation system based on com-
61. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 53.
62. Id.
63. The capacity determination rules of Bermuda I are considered liberal
since they allow the carriers themselves, and not their respective governments,
to determine capacity and fifth freedom rights. Bermuda I, supra note 58, Final
Act, paras 3-6. The carrier designation provision is considered liberal since it
allows for multiple designation - signatories are allowed to designate an "air
carrier or air carriers." Id., art. 2. The ratemaking provisions can be found in
sec. II of the Annex.
64. DEMSPEY, supra note 32, at 57.
65. See infra notes 132-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of U.S.
deregulation and its effects.
66. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
67. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 41, at 50.
68. Protocol Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport
Agreement of 1957, Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088 [hereinafter the Netherlands
Protocol]. The Netherlands Protocol amended the Air Transport Agreement,
Apr. 3, 1957, U.S.-Neth., 12 U.S.T. 837 [hereinafter the Netherlands
Agreement].
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petition among airlines in the marketplace with minimum gov-
ernmental regulation," and "to make it possible for airlines to
offer the traveling and shipping public low-fare competitive
services." 69
The Netherlands Protocol contains liberal provisions re-
garding capacity and fares. Capacity is unrestricted, except that
the air services made available "shall bear a close relationship to
the requirements of the public for such services."70 Fares are
also unrestricted and are to be set by the airlines, with govern-
ment intervention limited to "prevention of predatory or dis-
criminatory practices, protection of consumers from the abuse of
monopoly power, and protection of airlines from prices that are
artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental sub-
sidy or support."71
C. THE NETHERLANDS OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT AND GLOBAL
AIRLINE ALLIANCES
In October 1992, the United States and the Netherlands ex-
tended their commitment to the liberalization of trade in air
transport services by concluding the most liberal "open skies" 72
69. Netherlands Protocol, supra note 68.
70. Netherlands Agreement, supra note 68, art. 10, amended by, Nether-
lands Protocol, supra note 68, art. 11.
71. Netherlands Protocol, supra note 68, art. 6(a).
72. Although the term "open skies" has been subject to various interpreta-
tions over the years, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an
order in August, 1992, (two months prior to the conclusion of the Netherlands
Open Skies Agreement) establishing an official definition of "open skies." This
was done as part of a DOT initiative to negotiate open skies agreements with
European countries. The following basic elements constitute "open skies":
(1) Open entry on all routes;
(2) Unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes;
(3) Unrestricted route and traffic rights, that is, the right to operate
service between any point in the United States and any point in the
European country, including no restrictions as to intermediate and be-
yond points, change of gauge, routing flexibility, coterminalization, or
the right to carry Fifth Freedom traffic;
(4) Double-disapproval pricing in Third and Fourth Freedom markets
and [ i ] in intra-EU markets: price matching rights in third-country
markets, [ ii ] in non intra-EU markets: price leadership in third-coun-
try markets to the extent that the Third and Fourth Freedom carriers
in those markets have it;
(5) Liberal charter arrangement (the least restrictive charter regula-
tions of the two governments would apply, regardless of the origin of
the flight);
(6) Liberal cargo regime (criteria as comprehensive as those defined
for the combination carriers);
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agreement to date. The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement 7 3
gives U.S. and Dutch airlines open entry into each other's mar-
kets, unrestricted capacity and frequency on all routes and the
greatest possible degree of freedom in setting fares. 74
The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement is the first agree-
ment to give each country the right to designate as many air-
lines as it wishes to have access to unlimited route rights.75
Under the previous U.S.-Netherlands agreement, each country
could specify and limit the route access of the other country's
designated airlines. In contrast, the Netherlands Open Skies
Agreement allows each country's airlines access to "a point or
points" in the other country without limitation.7 6 Furthermore,
(7) Conversion and remittance arrangement (carriers would be able
to convert earnings and remit in hard currency promptly and without
restriction);
(8) Open code-sharing opportunities;
(9) Self-handling provisions (right of a carrier to perform/control its
airport functions going to support its operations);
(10) Procompetitive provisions on commercial opportunities, user
charges, fair competition and intermodal rights; and
(11) Explicit commitment for nondiscriminatory operation of and ac-
cess for computer reservation systems.
In re Defining "Open Skies," supra note 22.
73. Agreement to Amend the Air Transport Agreement, as amended, and
the Protocol Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport Agree-
ment of 1957, as amended, Oct. 14, 1992, U.S.-Neth., T.I.A.S. No. 11976 [here-
inafter the Netherlands Open Skies Agreement]. The Netherlands Open Skies
Agreement amended the Netherlands Agreement and the Netherlands Proto-
col, thereby incorporating all provisions of those agreements which it did not
displace.
74. Id., para. 9, 13. See also Netherlands, U.S. Declare Open Skies, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
File. One airline official describes the Netherlands Open Skies Agreement as
the "first and only true 'open skies' agreement in the world. . . . Fares are to-
tally deregulated. Routings are totally deregulated. Capacity is totally deregu-
lated. There literally are no restrictions." United States International Aviation
Policy, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Pub-
lic Works and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Elliott
M. Seiden, Vice-President - Law and Government Affairs, Northwest Airlines,
Inc.), available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter International
Aviation Policy Hearings].
75. Netherlands Open Skies Agreement, supra note 73, at para. 3. The
Netherlands Open Skies Agreement gives both the Netherlands and the United
States "the right to designate as many airlines as [they wish] to conduct inter-
national air services in accordance with [the] Agreement and to withdraw or
alter such designations." Id. In addition, "airlines of both countries can fly
from any point in either country to any point in the other, via any intermediate
point, and beyond to any point." International Aviation Policy Hearings, supra
note 74, (statement of Elliott M. Seiden, Vice-President - Law and Government
Affairs, Northwest Airlines, Inc.).
76. Netherlands Open Skies Agreement, supra note 73, para. 12.
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it places no restrictions on capacity or frequency. 77 In addition,
the Netherlands Open Skies Agreement retains the liberal rate
setting provisions of the Netherlands Protocol which delegates
ratemaking to the airlines "based primarily on commercial con-
siderations in the marketplace." 78 Finally, with respect to ancil-
lary matters, the Netherlands Open Skies Agreement allows for
the establishment of foreign sales offices and self ground-han-
dling by each of the designated airlines.7 9 It also contains provi-
sions for a dispute settlement mechanism.8 0
The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement has already helped
to foster an alliance 8 l between Northwest Airlines (Northwest)
and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). 82 The Department of
Transportation (DOT) approved the two airlines' integration
plan which allows them to operate as if they were a single global
airline system.8 3 The DOT also granted the two carriers anti-
trust immunity.8 4 The DOT stressed that it wanted to send a
clear signal to European governments that the cooperation
demonstrated by the United States with a foreign carrier was
77. Id., at para. 9 (1), (2). The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement pro-
vides that "[n]either Contracting Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of
traffic, frequency or regularity of service . . ." Id., para. 9 (2). In contrast, the
Netherlands Protocol required capacity to be related to traffic demand for serv-
ices. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. Netherlands Protocol, supra note 68, art. 6. Ratemaking is subject only
to government intervention to prevent monopolies, predatory pricing, and arti-
ficially low prices due to government subsidies. Id.
79. Netherlands Open Skies Agreement, supra note 73, para. 6.
80. Id., at para. 10. The agreement provides for a panel of three arbitra-
tors made up of one from each contracting party, and a third arbitrator, agreed
upon by both parties, to serve as President of the arbitral tribunal. In the event
that the parties cannot agree on a third arbitrator, the parties can request that
the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization
appoint one. The panel's decisions are final and each contracting party must
give the panel decision full effect, consistent with its national law. Id.
81. The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement specifically allows for the
right of designated airlines to "enter into cooperative arrangements such as
blocked-space, code-sharing or leasing agreements with another airline . . . "
and "hold out and advertise such services to the public as through services."
Netherlands Open Skies Agreement, supra note 73, at para. 12.
82. Open-Skies Pact Spurs KLM, Northwest to Operate as One, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
File.
83. Bill Poling, DOT Clears NWA, KLM to Operate as 'Single Carrier' in
Global Arena, TRAVEL WKLY., Jan. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, Trans Library,
Air File.
84. See Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, Inc., D.O.T.
Order No. 93-1-11, at 1 (1993), available in WESTLAW, FTRANS-DOT
Database (approving and granting antitrust immunity to Northwest and KLM
to integrate services).
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the direct result of the "open skies" agreement between the
United States and the Netherlands. 5 The DOT added that it
wanted to encourage other EU member states to enter into
"open skies" agreements with the United States.8 6
As a result of their alliance, Northwest and KLM have been
able to integrate their systems and use code-sharing which al-
lows all marketing, ticketing and baggage handling procedures
to be run as if by one airline.8 7 For example, under the alliance,
Northwest can offer its customers access to any of KLM's desti-
nations via Amsterdam - even destinations Northwest itself
does not service. The goal is to make flight service that com-
bines the two airlines as "seamless" as possible.88 It also allows
for expansion of access to air traffic routes8 9 since both airlines'
85. Poling, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. John J. Oslund, Flying the Open Skies: KLM-NWA Alliance Could
Serve as a Model for Other Airline Agreements, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept.
21, 1992, at 1D. A recent alliance between Continental and Alitalia Airlines
demonstrates the extent to which some partners are combining their marketing
operations. The two airlines have agreed to use planes painted with Alitalia's
colors on one side, and Continental's on the other. Continental, Alitalia Linking
Routes, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), May 3, 1994, at 3D.
88. Telephone interview with David G. Mishkin, Vice President for Inter-
national and Regulatory Affairs, Northwest Airlines Inc. (Feb. 7, 1994).
89. This route expansion generated controversy recently when Northwest
began adding flights to Germany via Amsterdam on planes operated by North-
west's partner, KLM. Adam Bryant, U.S. Tries to Restore the Once-Friendly
Skies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at D1. This upset the German government
which viewed the flights as a violation of the U.S.-German aviation agreement.
Germany contended that Northwest was not authorized to operate the shared
flights to Germany with KLM. Northwest responded that the U.S.-German avi-
ation accord was sufficiently pro-competitive to allow for the code-sharing serv-
ices with KLM. This dispute, in part, led to a threat by Germany to renounce
the U.S.-German aviation agreement. Id. However, the two countries were
able to renegotiate their agreement. Adam Bryant, Airline Accord Reached by
U.S. and Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1993, at C2. The two countries agreed
to a four-year deal which maintains current passenger capacity levels for two
years, and then allows limited capacity increases during the following two
years. During this time, the two countries hope to negotiate an "open skies"
agreement to be in place by the time the current accord expires. Joan M. Feld-
man, Bilateral Chaos: The U.S. Which Once Negotiated Bilaterals That Maxi-
mized Capacity, Is Forced To Retreat Under Protectionist Pressure, AR TRANSP.
WORLD, Nov. 1993, at 46, 46. While the new agreement puts some temporary
restrictions on U.S. airlines' access to Germany, id., it will ultimately result in
greater liberalization of trade in air services between the two countries.
Industry analysts speculated at the time that Germany would not with-
draw from the agreement with the United States because of concerns that such
a move would hinder the possibility of a marketing alliance between Lufthansa
and United Airlines. Bryant, supra. These predictions proved to be correct
when two weeks after Germany reached an agreement with the United States,
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respective route rights are effectively combined. 90 The alliance
has produced increased profits for both airlines.91
Marketing alliances, like the one between Northwest and
KLM, are evidence that as the shape of the airline industry
evolves, the international regulatory framework must also
evolve.9 2 While an alliance such as Northwest/KLM was un-
heard of at the time of the Chicago Conference in 1944, similar
alliances are becoming increasingly common as international
airlines join together to better position themselves as competi-
tors in the global market.9 3 In the absence of any liberalizing
Lufthansa announced an alliance with United. Lufthansa, United Planning to
Combine European and Asia/Pacific Networks, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct.
5, 1993, at ID.
A Northwest official recently testified that the Northwest-KLM alliance in-
creased the level of competition in the U.S.-Germany market. This, in turn,
caused the Germans to seek the alliance between Lufthansa and United. In
order to gain U.S. approval of that alliance, the Germans were forced to negoti-
ate a more liberal air transport agreement with the United States. Interna-
tional Aviation Policy Hearings, supra note 74, (statement of Elliott M. Seiden,
Vice-President - Law and Government Affairs, Northwest Airlines, Inc.). After
recently signing the new accord with the United States, the German Minister of
Transport, Matthias Wissman stated "Both partners want to be pioneers in the
area of open sky. Together, we will do our best to convince the other countries
to subscribe to this more liberal view of air transport." Germany to Seek Open
Skies in Next Agreement with U.S., AVIATION EuR., June 2, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
90. Oslund, supra note 87.
91. Northwest's Chief Financial Officer, Mickey Foret, recently reported
that the alliance was generating an economic benefit of $100 million a year for
each carrier. Northwest Reports $18.3 Million Profit in First Quarter, STAR
TRn. (Minneapolis), Apr. 22, 1994, at 1D, 5D.
92. E. Tazewell Ellett, International and U.S. Legal and Policy Impedi-
ments to the Growth of the Airline Industry: Time for a Change in the World
Order?, 5 AR & SPACE L. 3 (1991). The author points out that, "[u]nfortunately,
the ever-increasing business pressures for the creation of truly multinational
airlines are running into formidable obstacles created by an anachronistic in-
ternational civil aviation legal and policy framework which becomes more and
more outdated with each wave of business innovation." Id.
93. For example, Lufthansa and United have formed an alliance which in-
cludes code-sharing and will combine Lufthansa's strong presence in Europe
with United's extensive Asia/Pacific network. Lufthansa, United Planning to
Combine European and Asia / Pacific Networks, supra note 89. Also, a tentative
European alliance emerged called Alcazar. Its members include KLM, Swis-
sair, Scandinavian Airlines, and Austrian Airlines. Alcazar had hoped to select
an American partner - either Northwest or Delta. David Phelps, 4 European
Airlines Divided on Choice of U.S. Partner - Northwest or Delta, STAR TRm.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 15, 1993, at 1D. This initiative has apparently stalled as
the four Alcazar partners called off talks regarding their partnership due to
conflicting views on which airline to select as their U.S. partner. Roger Cohen,
European Airlines End Talks - Merger Plan Fails Over U.S. Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at D1. In addition, Sabena Belgian World Airlines has
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multilateral agreements, airlines are beginning to use the alli-
ance system as a "stopgap measure" to expand their services. 94
However, alliances that operate in the absence of an "open skies"
agreement are somewhat limited and less effective. For exam-
ple, the recent alliance between Lufthansa and United Airlines
has only limited code-sharing, and places restrictions on the in-
tegration of the two airlines' commercial activities.95 In order
that airlines might fully utilize network alliance systems, it is
imperative that the international aviation community move be-
yond the barriers of the current restrictive bilateral framework,
and achieve large scale liberalization in the trade of air traffic
services. The conclusion of the Netherlands Open Skies Agree-
ment signals a movement in the right direction.
III. LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT:
BENEFITS AND BARRIERS
A. THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE IN THE AIR
Further liberalization of the international air transport in-
dustry will likely lead to more competition, a wider range of
services, greater efficiency, and lower fares.96 The effect that
liberalization can have on fares in a domestic market has been
demonstrated. A Brookings Institution study found that U.S.
consumers have saved $6 billion (in 1977 dollars) in fares annu-
ally since domestic deregulation began in 1978. 9 7 In the United
Kingdom, where both British Airways and British Midland are
private companies and the air transport policy is relatively liber-
alized, passengers enjoy the lowest fares in the EU. Fares in
most other EU member states are thirty percent higher.98 An
expressed an interest in establishing "closer links" with Delta Airlines. Sabena
Looks for Closer Links with Delta Air Lines, AFX News, Mar. 28, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
94. Telephone Interview with David G. Mishkin, supra note 88.
95. International Aviation Policy Hearings, supra note 74, (statement of El-
liott M. Seiden, Vice-President - Law and Government Affairs, Northwest Air-
lines, Inc.).
96. Free Trade in the Air: Report of the Think Tank on Multilateral Avia-
tion Liberalization (Global Aviation Associates, Ltd.), Jan. 1991, at 11 [herein-
after Free Trade in the Air Report]
97. STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
AIRLINE DEREGULATION 1-2 (1986). This Brookings Institution study also found
that deregulation led to at least a $2.5 billion (in 1977 dollars) annual increase
in industry profits. Id. at 2.
98. Peter Woodman, 'Open Skies' Bring Lower Fares to UK, Press Ass'n
Newsfile, Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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expansion of liberalization internationally would likely produce
lower fares on a global level.
In addition to these direct benefits of liberalization, there
would also be important secondary effects 99 on other sectors of
the global economy. For example, the travel and tourism indus-
try is becoming increasingly important to the overall world econ-
omy. In the United States, travel and tourism has become the
nation's leading export. In 1990, the industry generated $52.8
billion in expenditures from almost forty million international
visitors. 100 The health and continued expansion of travel and
tourism depends a great deal upon the availability of affordable
and convenient air transportation. 10 ' One European author ar-
gues that since travel and tourism generate direct and indirect
employment for 200 million people worldwide (19 million in the
EU alone) and will create almost 150 million more jobs world-
wide over the next decade, the policy of "[p]rotecting [national
flag carriers] with high fares and subsidies ... obstructs this job
creation. Instead, the EU, with 20 m[illion] unemployed,
[should] open its airspace - and create more jobs throughout
its economy." 10 2
In addition, further liberalization on an inter-regional or
multilateral level will help to eliminate the problems associated
with the present bilateral regime. The current bilateral system
is viewed by many as time consuming,' 0 3 overly protective of na-
99. For example, the U.S. Commission stated in the National Commission
Report: "No U.S. citizen has to look far to find a friend, neighbor or relative
associated with civil air transport. From the tires on the airplanes to the seat-
belt restraints that protect passengers, the reach of the commercial air trans-
portation industry in the creation of jobs and economic activity in the U.S. is
immense." U.S. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. Civil air transport
plays a similarly important role in the economies of other countries besides the
United States.
100. Chuck Y. Gee, Aviation & Tourism: The Travelling Public, 20 TRANsP.
L.J. 1, 2 (1991).
101. Id.
102. Flights of Fancy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1994, at 69, 70.
103. One observer describes the process as follows:
Negotiations can drag on, requiring several rounds of meetings in each
country. Each round may last from a couple of days to several weeks.
The costs in manpower and time are enormous. Even a small country
such as Cyprus may have up to ten government and airline officials in
its negotiating team. Negotiators spend many days on each negotia-
tion, not only in the formal face-to-face meetings but in preparation as
well. The whole process is so slow that the larger countries normally
have a large backlog of bilateral negotiations, with many countries
each waiting their turns. A two-year wait is not unusual. Currently
about forty countries are waiting to negotiate new agreements with Ja-
pan. Thus, far from being flexible, the [bilateral] system militates
276 [Vol. 3:259
OPEN SIES
tional airlines, and detrimental to the interests of consumers,
airports and cities. The restrictive and protectionist measures
contained in many bilateral aviation agreements restrain the
business and operational opportunities of the airlines by acting
as non-tariff barriers 10 4 to free trade in air services.10 5
Although international air traffic has grown under the bi-
lateral system, it has now run up against serious limitations. As
a twelve-member think tank of industry experts recently
concluded:
Bilaterals are increasingly seen by entrepreneurial airline manage-
ments as imposing unacceptable restrictions on the development of the
industry. The bartering process of bilaterals tends to reduce the oppor-
tunities available to the level considered acceptable by the least com-
petitive and most restrictive party. Moreover, the practical problems,
in terms of time and expense, of negotiating and renegotiating dozens
of agreements is imposing enormous strains on the system. 106
A movement toward a multilateral negotiation framework would
alleviate many of the problems associated with the bilateral re-
gime, and facilitate the needed liberalization of the air transport
industry.
B. BARRIERS TO MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION
Before further liberalization on a large scale can occur,
there are several hurdles which must be cleared. Ever since the
delegates at the Paris Conference decided that a nation's air-
space is sovereign, air sovereignty has been a barrier to liberali-
zation.10 7 Airspace sovereignty has helped to produce the
current complex regime consisting of over 1200 bilateral avia-
tion agreements. However, sovereignty over air rights is an is-
sue that like-minded states could resolve once they recognize
that there are substantial benefits to be gained from
liberalization. 108
against quick decisions and rapid innovation. New services and new
market opportunities are delayed or may be lost altogether.
Rigas Doganis, The Bilateral Regime for Air Transport: Current Position and
Future Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD,
supra note 1, at 59.
104. Wassenbergh, supra note 5, at 88.
105. ICAO Delegates Oppose Early Shift From Bilateral System, WoRLD AIR-
LINE NEWS, Apr. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
106. Free Trade in the Air Report, supra note 96, at 13.
107. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
108. Countries have relinquished aspects of their sovereignty in the past to
gain membership to such organizations as the U.N. and GATT once they have
realized the benefits of joining those organizations.
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A more imposing stumbling block to liberalization lies in the
vested interest that some governments have in their state-
owned airlines. Fearful of what might happen to their airlines
in a competitive market, 0 9 such governments may attempt to
halt the movement toward "open skies." In fact, the amount of
state ownership in an airline is a solid indicator of a govern-
ment's views with respect to liberalization. Governments which
own or subsidize their airlines are more protectionist, while gov-
ernments in countries where airlines are not state owned or sub-
sidized are more liberal with respect to air transport trade.
A brief survey of several European countries illustrates this
point. In Britain, where British Airways" 0 and British Midland
are both privatized and profitable, the government favors fur-
ther liberalization."' The same is true in Switzerland where
the government owns only twenty-three percent of Swissair. 112
While the Dutch government's interest in KIM is higher at
thirty-eight percent, both the airline and the government are ar-
dent advocates of liberalization. 1 3 In contrast, the French gov-
ernment wholly owns Air France, 114 and both the government
and airline"15 oppose further liberalization. 1 16 In addition, the
governments of Greece (which owns 100% of Olympic Airways)
and Italy (which owns 86.4% of Alitalia Airlines) both maintain
109. For example, in order to reduce overcapacity and increase efficiency it
would be necessary to cut back on airlines' workforces. Such a move would be
politically unpopular.
110. In an article describing the benefits of privatization, British Airways
was described as having been "among the world's most profitable [airlines] for
several years, and despite the recession has built itself into one of the world's
few truly global carriers..." Richard W. Stevenson, The Pain of British Priva-
tization Has Yielded a String of Successes: Corporate Comebacks Tied to Effi-
ciency Drives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
111. See Michele McDonald, Most Europeans Remain Cautious About Air-
line Competition, TRAVEL WKLY, Oct. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allnws File.
112. See James Ott, More Skies to Open as U.S. Signs Pacts, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File.
113. Lubbers Says Dutch Government Has No Demands On Alcazar,
Reuters, Nov. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. A KLM
spokeswoman recently stated: "[ilt is KLM, not the Dutch government that
makes the decisions ... The government is a big shareholder with whom we
have regular conduct, but the suggestion that they decide is incorrect." Id.
114. Ott, supra note 112.
115. For example, at the recent ICAO World Air Transport Colloquium, Ber-
nard Attali, chairman of Air France, defended the bilateral system as a way to
preserve competition in the global airline industry. James Ott, Free Trade Ad-
vocates Foresee End of Bilaterals, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 13, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File.
116. Ott, supra note 112.
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restrictive and protectionist air services trade policies.117 Amer-
ican carriers are all privately held and they, along with the U.S.
government, favor further liberalization.1 1 8
U.S. carriers are privately held and thus face the risk of
bankruptcy if they operate inefficiently. 119 In contrast, many
EU airlines continue to depend on government subsidies which
allow them to operate less efficiently because profit margins are
not as crucial to their survival. 120 However, it appears that
there is a movement in the EU to end the practice of using subsi-
dies to protect airlines and distort competition. The EU Wise
Men Committee's report recommends that member-states' air-
lines only be eligible for one final "shot of aid," and only as much
as is necessary to put those airlines on a commercially viable
footing. 121
117. RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISION, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: MEASURES By EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY COULD LIMIT U.S. AIRLINES' ABILITY To COMPETE ABROAD,
GAO-RCED-93-64, 17, 33 (1993) [hereinafter GAO INTERNATIONAL AVIATION
REPORT].
118. Id. at 16, 19.
119. Interestingly, the EU views U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy laws as unfair
government assistance to U.S. airlines. The European Parliament recently
adopted a resolution requiring a revision in U.S. bankruptcy laws before the EU
will consider concluding any air transport agreements with the United States.
U.S. Bankruptcy Rules Need Revision Prior to Air Pact, EC Parliament Says,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Nov. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allnws File.
120. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 81-84.
121. Committee Recommends Liberalizing Rules for European Airline Indus-
try, supra note 11. The EU Committee chairman, Herman de Croo, further
stated that "capital injections and state aid have severely contributed to over-
capacity and uneconomic pricing" in the airline industry. He concluded, "[i]f we
do not change that, it will kill this most important sector of the economy."
'Change or Die' Warning to Airlines, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 1994, at 25.
While this proposal has received support from IATA and the Association of Eu-
ropean Airlines ("AEA"), the French government has openly denounced any lim-
itations on state aid to national air carriers. French Transport Minister called
the EU Wise Men Committee's Report a "brilliant intellectual exercise that does
not take into account today's economic and [political] realities." Air France
posted losses of $1.2 billion in 1993. Pierre Sparaco, France Resists Wise Men's
Report, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Trans
Library, Air File. Although initially very resistant to the EU Wise Men Re-
port's recommendations, Air France later announced a restructuring plan
which it hopes will boost productivity by 30% over three years. This plan will
cut staff costs by freezing salaries and eliminating 5,000 jobs. Pierre Tran, Air
France Rescue May Help Consumers in Long Run, Reuter Eur. Bus. Rep., Mar.
11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File. As EU airlines become
more competitive, they will be more likely to endorse "open skies" agreements
since they will feel more confident about competing in a free market. Robert
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In addition, state ownership may become less of a barrier to
liberalization because of a worldwide trend toward privatiza-
tion.122 Forty different airlines throughout the world have
moved, or are moving, toward private ownership. 123 In Europe,
the German government plans to sell its 56.9% stake in Luf-
thansa. 124 Greece, Portugal and Italy have also recently consid-
ered privatizing their respective state-owned airlines to varying
degrees.125 The most recent example of this trend occurred in
India where the Indian Government converted Air India and In-
dian Airlines into public limited companies in a first step to-
wards privatization. 126 In addition, India approved a unilateral
"open skies" policy without reciprocity requirements in hopes of
increasing competition and promoting tourism. 27 Israel re-
cently approved a similar "open skies" measure. 128 Thus, while
there are clearly barriers to liberalization, these examples
demonstrate that many countries are moving in the direction of
further liberalization.
Trautman, U.S. Acts to Open Global Skies, With Europe First, Reuter Eur.
Community Rep., Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
122. Michalski, supra note 1, at 17.
Further liberalisation appears to be likely nevertheless, as interna-
tional air transport gradually loses it distinct status. In the past, the
special regulatory treatment of the industry was largely predicated on
the desire of governments to maintain national flag-carriers to meet
prestige, military and security-of-supply objectives and to have a pro-
tected source of invisible earnings. As the strategic importance of effi-
cient international airline services for overall national competitiveness
becomes increasingly recognized, and as governments disengage them-
selves from the direct involvement in the provision of air services,
broad economic considerations - including the interests of users - favor-
ing liberalization are given increasing weight in the formulation of
public policies. Id.
123. Free Trade in the Air Report, supra note 96, at 12.
124. GAO INTERNATIONAL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 117, at 40.
125. Id.
126. Shirish Nadkarni, Air Corporation Act Repealed; Two National Carri-
ers Lose Their Status, So. CHINA MORNING PoST, Jan. 31, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. The two airlines have been renamed Air
India Ltd. and Indian Airlines Ltd., and will no longer be dependent on state
aid. They are now free to raise capital publicly. Id.
127. India to Open Skies to Foreign Airlines, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, Feb. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
128. Julian Ozanne, Israel Backs 'Open Skies' Policy to Encourage Tourism:
Charter Flight Rules Liberalised, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1994, at 6.
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IV. INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE EU
The greatest potential for further liberalization lies in the
possibility of an inter-regional open-skies agreement between
the United States and the EU. Although individuals like Repre-
sentative James Oberstar (D. Minn.-Chair-House Aviation Sub-
comm.) have called for another Chicago Conference to attempt to
reach a multilateral agreement, 129 this has yet to occur. 130 In
addition, given the difficulties and large amount of time inher-
ent in negotiating any all-inclusive multilateral trade agree-
ment,131 it is more likely that liberalization in the foreseeable
future will occur on an inter-regional basis.
While taking different approaches, both the United States
and EU have liberalized their internal air transport markets to
varying degrees. An examination of the liberalization that has
occurred within the United States and the EU suggests that
there is an unprecedented opportunity for the two parties to con-
clude an "open skies" agreement.
A. THE U.S. EXPERIENCE: DEREGULATION AND ATTEMPTS TO
EXPORT LIBERALIZATION
The deregulation of the U.S. airline industry produced dra-
matic changes in the U.S. aviation market, and helped spread
the ideology of airline liberalization to other nations. Given its
significance, it is necessary to consider the general principles
embodied in U.S. deregulation to determine if they are desirable
for a global liberalization strategy. In 1978, the United States
passed the Airline Deregulation Act 132 which entailed a liberali-
129. Telephone interview with Mary Walsh, Assistant to Representative
James Oberstar (Oct. 4, 1993). Oberstar has called for:
an international conference, similar to that in 1944 when all the na-
tions of the world joined to create what is today's international avia-
tion trade regime . . . . I think we should talk about cross border
investments and ownership and cabotage in order to fully liberalize
and unleash the forces of competition that have saved U.S. travelers
billions of dollars in the internal market.
Business World (ABC News television transcript, Feb. 23, 1992), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
130. However, the ICAO Conference scheduled for the end of 1994 could sig-
nal a move toward another multilateral convention to redefine international air
transport agreements. See supra note 6.
131. 'For example, the recently concluded Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, began in 1987 and concluded in December
1993.
132. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1988).
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zation of pricing and market entry. 133 These liberalization
measures helped produce increased competition which benefit-
ted consumers in the form of lower fares 3 4 and a wider range of
airline services. 135 Deregulation also promoted efficiency as air-
lines were forced to cut costs and streamline operations in order
to maintain profitability and protect their respective market
shares from being eroded by new entrants into the market. 136 A
1986 economics study prepared by the Brookings Institution
concluded that with respect to efficiency, deregulation served
the public interest more effectively than regulation would
have.137
The primary method employed by the airlines to increase
their efficiency after deregulation was to strengthen their
networking through "hubbing-and-spoking."13s Hub and spoke
services replaced the point to point networks that were in exist-
ence during the period of regulation. Airlines developed several
hubs - centrally located airports - that could be fed by a net-
work of numerous spokes. Flights are then scheduled to arrive
at similar times from the spokes, so that passengers can transfer
at the hub to connecting flights which then depart at a similar
time. 139 Industrial organization economists have argued that
133. Id. at 92 Stat. 1706, § 3(a)(4). The Act stressed the "placement of maxi-
mum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and potential compe-
tition (A) to provide the needed air transportation system, and (B) to encourage
efficient and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract capi-
tal." Id.
134. With the increase of new airlines in the market because of the liberali-
zation of entry requirements, competition increased and fares fell. See WEIS-
MAN, supra note 23, at 18-20.
135. The increase in competition coupled with the increase in the number of
newly-formed airlines led to an expansion in services as some airlines concen-
trated on basic, low fare/high traffic service, while others focused more on pre-
mium, high fare/low traffic service. Thus, consumers had a wider variety of
services to choose from. See id.
136. See id.
137. MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 97, at 72. The Brookings Study also
found that "deregulation has led to a yearly welfare gain to travelers and carri-
ers of roughly $8 billion (in 1977 dollars) without generating any substantial
losses to specific groups in society." Id. at 51. See also ELIZABETH BAILEY ET AL.,
DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 202 (1985) which concludes that "deregulation is
leading to a substantially more efficient airline system." Id.
138. See DANIEL M. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION: LIBERALIZ-
ING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AIR SERVICES 30-34 (1988).
139. This allows for an increase in the spoke-to-spoke connection possibili-
ties, as well as more frequent flights. This increase in frequency of flights bene-
fits the consumer. Also, smaller communities which might not have produced
enough traffic to support a direct service, were able to reach other destinations
via the hub. WEISMAN, supra note 23, at 21.
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hubbing-and-spoking networks produce economies of scope 140
which produce cost savings due to joint production of differenti-
ated products.141 An extension of this practice globally under a
liberalized aviation regime might produce similar cost savings
on an international level. By sharing a mutual hub, interna-
tional airline alliance partners could coordinate the pooling of
similar destination passengers arriving from different interna-
tional starting points, and create greater efficiencies in their in-
ternational operations.
Although deregulation in the United States did not elimi-
nate all market imperfections in air transport services, most ob-
servers agree that it produced increased efficiency and benefits
for both consumers and airlines. 142 Deregulation has contrib-
uted to the creation of jobs,' 43 a rise in airline employee sala-
ries,144 and a decrease in airfares. 145 On the other hand, critics
of deregulation charge that these successes have been marred by
"excessive concentration, destructive competition, and unfair
pricing."146 Some critics have even advocated "roll[ing] back de-
regulation." 47 However, even these critics admit that it is
140. See id. at 35-38. While an in-depth analysis of the theory of economies
of scope is beyond the reach of this Note, a brief description is in order. Econo-
mies of scope exist whenever the cost of providing the services of shareable in-
put of two or more product lines are subadditive (i.e., less than the total cost of
providing these services for each product line separately). In the airline con-
text, hubbing and spoking allows the airlines to attain economies of scope by
agglomerating passengers from different spokes (different product lines). This
allows for an increase in density of passengers on flights making operations
more efficient and the cost of different product lines subadditive. See id.
141. Id. at 5, 36-37.
142. Id. at 25.
143. Joe Cobb, The Airline Commission's Boost for Deregulation, HERITAGE
FoUND. REP., Sept. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
The number of airline industry employees was 540,412 in 1992, as compared to
330,495 in 1982 (an increase of 64%). Id.
144. Overall industry salaries and wages in 1992 were 34% higher in nomi-
nal dollars than in 1982. Id.
145. Consumers have saved $6 billion in fares annually since deregulation
took effect in 1978. See MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 97 and accompany-
ing text.
146. Bruce Stockfish, Opening Closed Skies: The Prospects For Further Lib-
eralization of Trade in International Air Transport Services, 57 J. AIR L. & COM.
599, 623 (1992).
147. Paul S. Dempsey, The Disintegration of the U.S. Airline Industry, 20
TRANsp. L.J. 9, 44 (1991). Professor Dempsey argues that deregulation was a
bad recipe for the U.S. airline industry. He explains:
There are more than two temperatures at which to cook a pot of stew.
In the 1970s, the competitive dial was set on LOW. The stew wasn't
warm enough, so Congress turned the dial up to HIGH by promulgat-
ing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The competitive bubbles be-
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highly unlikely that the United States will return to the level of
regulation that existed in 1977.148
In addition to deregulating its own airline industry, the
United States has attempted to export its liberalization ideals
internationally by renegotiating and attempting to liberalize a
series of pre-existing bilateral air transport agreements. This
strategy has met with only limited success as many countries
maintain single national flag carriers which they protect based
on claims of national security, national pride and other non-eco-
nomic factors. 149 Along with opposing liberalization, these coun-
tries favor the bilateral system because it allows them to better
protect their sovereignty. 150
As part of the U.S. attempt to export deregulation on a
global basis, Congress passed the International Air Transporta-
tion Competition Act of 1979.151 The Act declared that U.S. air
transport policy negotiating principles should emphasize the
"greatest degree of competition that is compatible with a well-
functioning international air transportation system."15 2 In ef-
fect, the goal of the Act was to export deregulation to the inter-
national level. 153 The Act failed in this objective largely because
it was an attempt to force multilateral liberalization by export-
ing U.S. domestic deregulation bilaterally - and on an interna-
tional level with little account of the diversity of other countries'
aviation trade policies.' 54 Many countries that oppose liberali-
zation were not receptive to entering into liberal bilateral agree-
gan to boil, causing stew to splatter over the side of the pot. The aroma
was sweet for a short while, until it turned foul with smoke. Before the
stew burns a charcoal black, Congress should turn the dial down to
MEDIUM, so that we can have stew the public can eat.
Id. at 42-43.
148. See id. at 44.
149. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 82.
150. ICAO Calls Session on Future Airline Regulation, AiRLINE FIN. NEWS,
July 22, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. State sover-
eignty over airspace has sowed a seed of fragmentation in the international air
transport regime since any state essentially has a veto power as to who is able
to fly into their country. NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 230. For an explanation of
the origin of sovereignty's role in the air transport trade regime, see supra notes
26-30 and accompanying text.
151. International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C. (1988)).
152. Id., § 17. An additional stated purpose was to prevent "unfair, decep-
tive, predatory, or anticompetitive practices in air transportation." Id.
153. See NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 144-50.
154. See id. at 145.
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ments with the United States. 155 Thus, while this effort had
some limited success, 15 6 it failed to substantially liberalize the
international air transport regime.
While the U.S. attempt at exporting liberalization under the
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979157
was essentially a bilateral attempt to attain a multilateral re-
sult, the United States has also taken steps to promote liberali-
zation unilaterally. For example, the Underserved Cities
Program,' 5 8 initiated by the Bush Administration, allows a for-
eign airline to introduce a new international service to a U.S.
city, without a separate bilateral negotiation, provided that no
U.S. carrier wants to serve the route, and the United States has
a procompetitive agreement in place with the airline's home
country. 159 A 1992 study published by the United States Air-
ports for Better International Air Service (USA-BIAS) concluded
that the seventeen new services approved under this program
generated $3.8 billion in annual revenues for nine of its member
cities and created 83,000 new jobs.16 0
The most recent expression of the U.S. aviation policy is
presented in The Clinton Administration's Initiative to Promote
a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry (Clinton Initiative).16 1
The Clinton Initiative adopted many of the international policy
recommendations made by the National Commission to Ensure
a Strong and Competitive Airline Industry.16 2 The Administra-
tion's four general strategies are:
1) The United States will actively seek unrestricted multilateral
agreements with those groups of nations that are willing to grant com-
parable benefits to U.S. carriers and to [the U.S.] economy;
155. However, the EU is now in the process of making its laws uniform
throughout the Union, possibly clearing the way for a common external Union
aviation policy. See infra notes 178-211 and accompanying text.
156. Under this policy, the United States concluded liberal agreements with
countries such as Israel and Peru. See NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 151-52. The
Netherlands Protocol is another such agreement concluded as a result of the
U.S. policy. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
158. See Expanding International Air Service Opportunities to More U.S.
Cities, 55 Fed. Reg. 4039 (Feb. 6, 1990).
159. See id.
160. USA-BIAS Wants DOT to Press for More International Routes, AvIA-
TION DAILY, Dec. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air File. Cities
that have benefited from this program include Baltimore, Detroit, Minneapolis,
Washington, Charlotte, and Philadelphia. Id.
161. Administration Unveils Sweeping Aviation Initiative, INSIDE DOT &
TRANsp. WK., Jan. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
162. See supra notes 9-10, 16-19 and accompanying text.
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2) While the United States will pursue multilateral accords, it will
also seek to liberalize existing bilateral agreements;
3) The United States will vigorously defend all existing bilateral rights
and take appropriate actions where necessary;
4) The United States will explore the formation of a global coalition of
like-minded, free market nations that recognize the benefits to citizens
and national economies of expanded air travel. 163
The U.S. commitment to liberalization will be tested in up-
coming open skies negotiations with Canada.164 The United
States already has a liberal bilateral agreement with Mexico. 165
Although aviation agreements were not included in the North
American Free Trade Agreement 16 6 (NAFTA), the cooperation
exercised by these three countries in concluding NAFTA sug-
gests that now is an ideal time to explore the formation of a re-
gional "open skies" area in North America.
B. THE EU LIBERALIZATION MOVEMENT
As noted earlier, in contrast to the free-market arena in
which U.S. airlines operate, many of Europe's airlines fly in a
market filled with government owned or subsidized carriers.16 7
European countries, for the most part, view their airlines as
"public utilities" - a service that needs to be provided on a non-
discriminatory basis to all citizens even at the cost of ineffi-
163. Transportation Secretary Federico Pefia, Speech at the Department of
Transportation Briefing (Jan. 6, 1994), Federal News Service, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File [hereinafter DOT Briefing].
164. See Kevin Dougherty, Pressure Builds for New Air Deal with U.S., FIN.
POST, Feb. 15, 1994, at 3. It is expected that Canadian Transport Minister
Doug Young and U.S. Transportation Secretary Pefia will meet to discuss a new
air transport agreement sometime in 1994. See id.
165. Chris Aspin, A Status Quo Maintained: Airlines Under a NAFTA, Bus.
MExICo, June, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
166. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-
Canada, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
167. Duane E. Woerth, Assessing International Aviation, AIRLINE PILOT,
Aug. 1992, at 33-34, cited in David T. Arlington, Comment, Liberalization of
Restrictions on Foreign Ownership in U.S. Air Carriers: The United States
Must Take the First Step in Aviation Globalization, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 133, 168
n.198 (1993). As of August 1992, the percentage of government ownership of
Europe and Asia's top airlines was as follows:
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ciency and higher fares. 168 This combination of regulation and
subsidization has produced an anti-competitive and inefficient
air transport market.16 9 As a result, European air fares are, on
average, about four times greater than air fares in the United
States.170 Further, European airlines have operating costs that
are forty-eight percent higher than those of their American
counterparts. 1 71 The only European airlines which regularly
make a profit are British Airways and British Midland-both of
which are privately owned. 172 As part of their plan to
strengthen the European airline industry, the EU Committee of
Wise Men has recommended eliminating subsidies to EU air-
lines. 173 The plan is just one part of an overall movement to-
ward the liberalization of the EU aviation market.
EUROPE
Air France
Iberia
Olympic
TAP-Air Portugal
JAT-Yugoslav
Aer Lingus
Alitalia
Austria
Finnair
Sabena
SAS
Lufthansa
KLM
Swissair
British Airways
Icelandair
Airline %
Govt. Owned
100
100
100
100
100
100
83
75.8
70
[62.51*
50
48
39
ASIA
Air China Intl.
China Airlines
Garuda Indonesia
Phillipine Air
Thai Airways
Vietnam Airlines
Singapore
Malaysia
Korean Air
All Nippon
Japan Airlines
Air India
Airline %
Govt. Owned
100
100
100
100
100
100
55
52
0
0
0[0]**
Id. *Sabena is, in effect, 100% government owned - the Belgian government
owns 62.5% of its national carrier, and Air France (which is 100% government
owned itself) controls the remaining 37.5% of Sabena. Belgium Presses 'Separa-
tion' of Sabena From Air France, AVIATION EUR., June 30, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Alnws File. **Air India was converted into a public lim-
ited company in 1994. Nadkarni, supra note 126.
168. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 93-95.
169. Lisa Buckingham, An Air of Absurdity, GUARDIAN, Feb. 5, 1994, at 23.
Furthermore, 95% of all European routes are monopolies or duopolies and only
26 routes out of more than 600 include more than two operators. Id.
170. Id.
171. Flights of Fancy, supra note 102, at 69.
172. Buckingham, supra note 169.
173. Flights of Fancy, supra note 102, at 69. See also supra note 19, and
note 121 and accompanying text.
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1. Origins of a Unified European Air Transport Policy
The European Economic Community (EEC), now known as
the EU, was created in 1957 by the EEC Treaty.174 The goal of
the EEC Treaty was to create a "common market" and listed as
one of its objectives the adoption of a common policy in the
sphere of transport. 175 Since air and sea transport had external
international implications, the Treaty limited its express cover-
age at the time to road, rail and inland waterways. 176 It pro-
vided that air and sea transport could be incorporated at a later
date by unanimous European Council action.' 77
In the early 1970s, the European Community Commis-
sion 178 (the "Commission") and the European Community
Council of Ministers 179 (the "Council") began considering liberal-
ization and unification proposals for the European airline indus-
try.'80 In 1979, the Commission issued its first official
Memorandum concerning air transport services. 181 Civil Avia-
tion Memorandum No. l's objective was to increase competition
gradually in order to improve flexibility and innovation in the
air transport industry.'8 2 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2,183
released five years later, while recognizing that "American style
deregulation would not work in the present European context,"
sought to pressure European airlines into increasing their effi-
174. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC TREATY or Treaty of Rome]. The
original signatories were Belgium, Italy, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. GAO
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 117, at 12.
175. EEC TREATY, supra note 174, art. 3 (e).
176. Id. art. 84.
177. Id. art. 84 (2).
178. The Commission is a non-partisan executive body comprised of 17 Com-
missioners chosen by the member states. Its goal is to oversee EU development
and ensure that business transactions are conducted in conformity with the rel-
evant provisions of the EEC TREATY. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 97.
179. The Council of Ministers consists of representatives from each member
state and is the governing body of the EU responsible for carrying out the objec-
tives of the Union. Id. at 98.
180. NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 185.
181. 8139/79, Memorandum by the Commission on the Contribution of the
European Communities to the Development of Air Transport Service, EUR.
Comm. BULL. No. 5 (1979).
182. Stacy K. Weinberg, Note, Liberalization of Air Transport: Time for the
EEC to Unfasten its Seatbelt, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 433, 439 (1986).
183. Proposal for a Council Decision on Bilateral Agreements, Arrange-
ments and Memoranda of Understanding Between Member States Relating to
Air Transport, 1984 O.J. (C 182) 1-2.
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ciency and providing better service and lower fares to passen-
gers. 184 While these Memoranda were promising indicators of
liberalization of the EU air transport regime, neither of the two
memoranda were officially adopted by the Council.' 8 5
In 1986, the European Court of Justice helped to clarify the
extent to which the EEC Treaty applies to air transport in the
EU when it decided the Nouvelles Fronti res case.' 86 The spe-
cific issue in the case was whether the French government's pro-
hibition of the sale of airline tickets below a government
established price floor constituted a violation of the EEC Treaty
competition or antitrust laws. These laws prohibit non-competi-
tive behavior such as price fixing, and in general promote free
trade among EU member states.'8 7 The court ruled that
France's action was a violation and stated that "like other
means of transport, air transport remains subject to the general
rules of the Treaty including those concerning competition."' 8
Thus, although the two Memoranda were not adopted, the
Nouvelles Frontires decision means that anti-competitive be-
havior by EU airlines can be policed by the Commission under
the competition rules. Following the decision, the Commission
brought enforcement proceedings against several major EU air-
lines alleging anti-competitive behavior in violation of Article 85
of the EEC Treaty. 8 9 This threat of litigation caused the ac-
cused airlines to conform their restrictive tariff, pooling, and ca-
pacity agreements with Article 85.190 By forcing airlines to
comply with the competition rules, the EU air transport market
has become more competitive.
2. The EU Liberalization Packages
The Single European Act, 191 adopted in 1986, set as its goal
the creation of a single European market without internal fron-
184. DEMPSEY, supra note 32, at 101. More specifically, Memorandum No. 2
called for liberalization in the following areas: capacity; market entry; state
aid; pricing; and competition. Id.
185. Weinberg, supra note 182.
186. Cases 209-213/84, Minist~re Public v. Lucas Asjes, 32 E.C.R. 1425, 3
C.M.L.R. 173 (1986). [hereinafter Nouvelles Frontires].
187. EEC TREATY, supra note 174, arts. 85-86.
188. Nouvelles Frontires, supra note 186.
189. See Werner F. Ebke & Georg W. Wenglorz, Liberalizing Scheduled Air
Transport Within the European Community: From the First Phase to the Sec-
ond and Beyond, 19 TRANsP. L.J. 417, 431-33 (1991).
190. Id.
191. Single European Act, adopted in Luxembourg on Feb. 17, 1986 and at
The Hague on Feb. 28, 1986, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 506, No. 12 (1986), 1987 O.J.
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tiers in which the free movement of services (including air trans-
port), goods, labor, and capital is unimpeded.' 9 2 In preparation
for the single European market's target date of January 1, 1993,
the Council adopted its first civil aviation liberalization package
in 1987.193 The rules in this package supplanted more restric-
tive rules between the EU member states and "marked the first
step toward a more liberal regime."1 94 These rules allowed
member states to designate several of their airlines to operate
certain air services, created new traffic rights, and liberalized
capacity and fare regulations. 195
In June 1990, the second liberalization package was
adopted by the Council and became effective in November
1990.196 This measure further relaxed regulations on market
access, capacity sharing, and fares. 197 The third package, 198
which became effective in 1993, established the framework for a
legitimate internal market for air transport, consisting of free-
dom of establishment and freedom to provide services. 199 It al-
lows nationals of member states to establish airlines in other
member states,200 removes capacity restrictions, and creates
traffic rights on substantially all EU routes.20 1 Fares are freed
(L 169). [hereinafter SEA]. Article 8A of the SEA specifically refers to Article
84, the article in the EEC Treaty that deals with air transport. Id. at 511. Most
of the provisions in the Single European Act are amendments to the EEC
Treaty or new provisions that were added to the treaty. Single European Act a
Milestone on the Road Toward a European Union, 4 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10, 812 (1986) (CCH Comment).
192. SEA, supra note 191, at art. 8A.
193. Council Directive No. 87/601 on fares for scheduled air services be-
tween Member States; Council Decision No. 87/602 on the sharing of passen-
gers capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between Member
States and on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between
Member States, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 12-26. See also Ben Van Houtte, Community
Competition Law in the Air Transport Sector (1), 18 AIR & SPACE L. 61, 62
(1993).
194. Van Houtte, supra note 193, at 62.
195. Id.
196. Council Regulations No. 2342/90 on fares for scheduled air services and
No. 2343/90 on access for air carriers to scheduled intra-Community air service
routes and on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on sched-
uled air services between Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 217), 1-14.
197. Jeffrey R. Platt, The Creation of a Community Cabotage Area in the
European Community and its Implications for the US Bilateral Aviation Sys-
tem, 17 AIR & SPACE L. 183, 184-85 (1992).
198. Council Regulations No. 2407/92 on licensing for air carriers, No. 2408/
92 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes, and No.
2409/92 on fares and rates for air services, 1992 O.J. (L 240).
199. Van Houtte, supra note 193, at 62.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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from oversight by any member state's authority, subject only to
restrictions on predatory or excessive pricing.20 2
Thus, while some regulation still exists, European airlines
are now largely free to compete on intra-Union routes.20 3 Fur-
ther, by April 1997, the EU will allow for cabotage - the right
to fly domestic sectors in a foreign country - among the mem-
ber states.20 4 While the EU liberalization packages are only in
effect with respect to the twelve member states, they will be ex-
tended to six of the seven members of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA)205 once the EU and EFTA finalize the Euro-
pean Economic Area (EEA).206
3. The Next Step: External EU Aviation Policy
Until recently, the EU's air transport policy has focused pri-
marily on internal liberalization. Although the liberalization
packages have transformed the EU's "international" bilateral
system into a "domestic" system based on multilateral princi-
ples, 20 7 EU member states still have separate agreements with
countries outside of the Union and maintain their own separate
negotiating authority.20 8 The adoption of a common external
policy combined with individual member states ceding their ne-
gotiating authority to the EU Commission, are necessary pre-
conditions to the successful conclusion 20 9 of any EU air
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Flights of Fancy, supra note 102, at 70.
205. Toby R. Gooley, Countdown to the New Europe; Western Europe Unifi-
cation; The New Europe, TRAFFIC MGMT., Sept. 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File. The European Free Trade Association consists of Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Id.
206. Wise Men: Bilaterals Ignore 'New Realties' of Single Market, supra note
21. The EU liberalization measures will not apply to Switzerland. Id.
207. Id., citing EU Committee of Wise Men Report. This, in effect, has made
the EU internal aviation market more like the internal aviation market of the
United States.
208. Id. On average, each EU member state has 60-70 different bilateral air
transport agreements with countries outside of the EU. Id.
209. While the EU is and will continue to be the dominant force in negotiat-
ing a single external European aviation agreement, two other organizations de-
serve mention. First, the Association of European Airlines ("AEA") is
comprised of 20 Western European airlines and contributes opinions and re-
search to the formation of European aviation policy. DEMPSEY, supra note 32 at
95-100. Second, the European Civil Aviation Conference ("ECAC") is an organi-
zation comprised of representatives of 22 member states. This organization
also helps to form European aviation policy. In 1982, the ECAC was instru-
mental in concluding an agreement between 12 of its member states and the
United States. See The Memorandum of Understanding (on air fares for sched-
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transport agreements with outside countries. 210 Recognizing
the inefficiencies of the present situation, the EU Committee of
Wise Men has recommended the adoption of a common external
aviation policy by the middle of 1995.211
V. A PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZING TRADE
IN AIR SERVICES
As the EU's internal liberalization nears completion, there
will be an opportunity for the United States and the EU to ex-
pand their liberalization philosophies to an unprecedented inter-
national level. For the first time, the United States (1990
population-250 million) will have an equivalent market in the
EU (1990 population-340 million) with which to negotiate an
"open skies" agreement. 212 Given this unprecedented opportu-
nity, it is necessary to consider what liberalization strategy
would be the most effective and practical to pursue.
A. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
Further international liberalization may be possible at a bi-
lateral level if countries conclude bilateral agreements with the
same standard terms. 213 For example, prior to the adoption of a
uled services over the North Atlantic) Between ECAC States and the United
States, Washington, 2 May 1982, cited in NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 68-73.
210. E.C. Role in Negotiating Airline Pacts on Access Debated by Transport
Ministers, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Sept. 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File. There is some resistance to the EU taking this role. Brit-
ain, for example, is negotiating with the United States for a new air transport
agreement and does not favor any EU-wide negotiated agreement at this time.
Id.
211. Wise Men: Bilaterals Ignore 'New Realties' of Single Market, supra note
21. Since EU member states disagree on the amount of control they are willing
to cede to the EU commission for air transport negotiations with third coun-
tries, many European aviation officials believe that it might be 5-10 years
before the EU Commission gains the necessary negotiating authority. GAO IN-
TERNATIONAL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 117, at 32-33. In 1990 and 1992, the
EU Commission submitted proposals which would establish the legal basis for
it to negotiate on behalf of the EU with outside countries. Neither proposal has
yet been adopted. Id., at 33-34.
212. Michael Goldman & Cyril Murphy, Multilateral Age Approaches; Inter-
national Aviation Agreements Shift From Bilateral to Multilateral Strategies,
AIRLINE Bus., Feb., 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. In
addition, the two parties have similar economic markets. In 1990, the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States was $5.5 trillion, while the GDP
of the EU was $6.0 trillion at that time. GAO INTERNATIONAL AVIATION REPORT,
supra note 117, at 12 n.2.
213. Michael E. Levine, Scope and Limits of Multilateral Approaches to In-
ternational Air Transport, in INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT: THE CHALLENGES
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common external policy in the EU, the United States could nego-
tiate "open skies" agreements with several different like-minded
European states which incorporate the same liberal standard
terms with respect to market access, capacity, and pricing. Such
standard agreements would provide the basis for eventual mul-
tilateral negotiations. 214 However, past U.S. attempts to
achieve liberalization through bilateral agreements have met
with only limited success. 215 In addition, as the EU becomes
more integrated and moves closer to developing a common exter-
nal policy - single member states will likely delay entering into
"open skies" agreements with third countries until the question
of a common external EU policy is resolved.
A more comprehensive approach to liberalization is "ideal"
multilateralism, 216 which incorporates certain basic principles
expressed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 217 It would allow each member state's airlines to com-
pete for passengers regardless of a carrier's nationality. 218
Eventually, all carriers would be able to carry cargo and passen-
gers on equal terms with other market participants - national
treatment in GATT terms. 219 Most Favored Nation (MFN) sta-
tus 220 would also apply since "ideal" multilateralism would re-
quire that the extension of any privilege by one country to
another be extended automatically to all other member
countries. 221
"Ideal" multilateralism was considered during the Uruguay
Round in the context of negotiations on the inclusion of aviation
services within the GATT framework under the rubric of the
AHEAD supra note 1, at 82-84. This has been referred to as the concept of "De-
fined Standard Multilateral Terms." Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
216. Levine, supra note 213, at 75.
217. See GATT, supra note 2.
218. Levine, supra note 213, at 75.
219. The national treatment obligation of GAT requires that "internal
taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements af-
fecting the internal sale ... of products,... not be applied to imported or do-
mestic goods so as to afford protection to domestic production." GATT art. 111:1.
220. The MFN principle is the principle of "non-discrimination." GATT art.
I contains an MFN obligation which states that "any advantage, favour, privi-
lege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncondi-
tionally to the like product originating or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties." Id., art. I:A.
221. Levine, supra note 213, at 75.
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 222 Largely
due to U.S. opposition, the final Uruguay Round Agreement in-
cludes only an annex on air transport services which excludes
"hard rights"-air traffic rights. The annex does include "soft
rights" such as aircraft repair and maintenance services, the
marketing of air-transport services and computer reservation
services. 223
The primary U.S. objection to the inclusion of air traffic
rights in GATT was a belief that GATT's MFN obligation would
work to discourage liberalization. 224 Since MFN requires that
any concession granted to one state be applied to all member
states, smaller states would be likely to act as "free riders" and
have no incentive to liberalize their own markets.225 Larger
states, on the other hand, would delay extending concessions un-
til they could complete the complex task of determining the net
benefits of extending these concessions to all member nations. 2
26
Given the difficulties of negotiating an all inclusive multi-
lateral agreement and the limited impact inherent in the bilat-
eral approach, the most constructive alternative is a plurilateral
agreement - a compact between two or more nations which
other nations are encouraged to endorse and become parties
to. 22 7 A plurilateral agreement begins as a bilateral or a limited
multilateral agreement and expands into a more inclusive mul-
222. Although GATT previously covered only trade in goods, the recent
adoption of GATS extends the coverage of GATT principles to trade in specific
services. GATT, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, done Dec. 15, 1993, MTN/FA II-A1B at 3
[hereinafter GATS].
223. GATS, Annex on Air Transport Services, id. at 37. At one point the U.S.
negotiators were prepared to include air transport in a GATS provision in order
to have other services covered under GATT. Paul V. Mifsud, New Proposals for
New Directions: 1992 and the GATT Approach to Trade in Air Transport Serv-
ices, 13 AIR L. 154, 165 (1988). However, they eventually aligned themselves
with the domestic airlines industry who felt that GAT was not the appropriate
forum for the regulation of trade in air traffic rights. This belief was based on
concerns regarding the applicability of MFN to trade in air services, and the
inadequacy of GATT's dispute settlement mechanism and procedure. Joan M.
Feldman, On Getting From Here to There; International Aviation Structure is
Becoming Obsolete, AR TRANs. WORLD, July 1990, available in LEXIS, Trans
Library, Air File.
224. Stockfish, supra note 146, at 641-42.
225. KASPER, supra note 138, at 95-100.
226. Id.
227. Id., at 120-21. A variation on plurilateralism is possible in that "many
... successful bilateral air service agreements include a provision that, should a
multilateral agreement accepted by both parties come into force, their bilateral
agreement will be amended to conform to the multilateral agreement." Dr. As-
sad Kotaite, Multilateralism: A View from ICAO, in AIR TRANSPORT LAw AND
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tilateral agreement.2 28 Thus, it has been referred to as "phased
multilateralism." 22 9 This process could also occur on an inter-
regional basis between representatives of similar blocs of like-
minded trading partners. Once the initial parties reach, an
agreement, other blocs or states would be eligible to sign on to
the stated terms of the agreement and further liberalize trade in
air services.
B. PRINCIPLES OF A MODEL "OPEN SKIES" AGREEMENT
There are certain fundamental principles 230 that should be
included in any liberal air transport agreement. 23 1 First, the
agreement should provide that market access in member states
be open and that there be no restrictions on capacity or fre-
quency of services.2 3 2 Second, it should provide that all fares
and rates be determined by the market, subject only to competi-
tion rules, and all other governmental controls on pricing should
be eliminated. 2 33 In order to help ensure that this liberalization
does not lead to an oligopoly situation where a few major players
dominate the market, rules are needed to prohibit anti-competi-
tive agreements, predatory behavior and abuse of dominant
market position. 234 Non-discriminatory rules are also necessary
for matters such as fair commercial opportunities, setting up
sales and distribution offices in member countries, ground han-
dling, and other airport facilitation issues essential to airline op-
portunities. 23 5 Finally, a model "open skies" agreement must
POLICY IN THE 1990S: CONTROLLING THE BOOM 89, 92 (Pablo Mendes de Leon
ed., 1991).
228. Ott, supra note 112.
229. Levine, supra note 213, at 79.
230. Whatever liberalization measures are taken, safety standards must
continue to take precedence over economic considerations. NAVEAU, supra note
3, at 233. It is also important that the effects of aviation on the environment
continue to be monitored. Id. at 227-28. Finally, it is necessary to maintain the
ICAO as a forum for nations to exchange technical information, as well as to
help, as the ICAO charter notes, "foster the planning and development of inter-
national air transport." Id. at 51.
231. Free Trade in the Air Report, supra note 96, at 15-16. This report,
drafted in 1991, was produced by a think tank of international aviation authori-
ties, including both airline executives and former high-level government lead-
ers in the field of aviation. Id. at i-ii.
232. Id. at 15.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 16.
235. Id. These are commonly referred to as "doing business" rules. Id.
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have an accession clause open to any state willing and able to
abide by the agreement's terms.236
C. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZATION
1. U.S.-EU Negotiations: A Starting Point
The greatest potential for liberalizing air transport under
the above principles lies in a plurilateral, inter-regional agree-
ment between the United States and the EU. Both parties have,
to varying degrees, liberalized their internal markets. How-
ever, prior to any serious U.S.-EU passenger agreement negotia-
tions, the EU must develop a common external aviation
policy, 237 and member states must "denationalize" their air-
lines.2 38 Otherwise, claims of sovereignty will continue to frag-
ment the international aviation regulatory landscape, and EU
air transport policy will continue to lag behind other free trade
measures taken within the European Union.239
The impact of a U.S.-EU agreement would be great as it
would directly affect almost 600 million people. 240 In addition,
it is a realistic possibility since it would involve two roughly
equivalent markets with similar bargaining power,241 and
would bring together two like-minded parties. Once concluded,
such an agreement should be open to any other states willing to
comply with its terms and conditions. 242
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
238. NAVEAU, supra note 3, at 204-05. "Denationalization" requires, inter
alia, that EU member states cease viewing their airlines as state property, and
halt all subsidies to carriers. Id.
239. One author observes, "[tioday Phillips, the Dutch electronics firm, can
build a manufacturing facility in Barcelona with relative ease. But if KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines sought to establish hub-and-spoke operations centered in
Barcelona, the Spanish Air Force would likely be scrambled to escort the KLM
jets out of sovereign Spanish airspace." Paul S. Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over
Europe: The Liberalization of EEC Air Transport, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 615, 682
(1988).
240. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
242. There is interest outside of the EU and the United States in multilat-
eral air transport liberalization. For example, India and Israel have recently
adopted "open skies" policies. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
In Asia, an airline official in Singapore recently criticized the bilateral process
as producing fragmented liberalization, and proposed inter-regional negotia-
tions. Regional Aviation Ties Should be "Less Restrictive", STRAITs TIMES, Sept.
9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. (Comments by
Mathew Samuel, Singapore Airlines' director of corporate affairs, at the Malay-
sian Chartered Institute of Transportation National Transportation Confer-
ence, Sept. 8, 1992). The Chairman of Japan Airlines has recognized an
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As an initial step toward multilateral passenger aviation
liberalization, the United States and the EU should conclude an
all-cargo agreement that would create "open skies" for air cargo
services. This type of agreement would face fewer barriers since
the United States already has very liberal cargo accords with
several European countries. 243 Preliminary negotiations for
such an "open skies" air cargo agreement are tentatively sched-
uled to begin in 1994.244 Although analysts are optimistic about
the successful conclusion of an all-cargo agreement, they are less
hopeful about the conclusion of a similar "open skies" passenger
agreement in the near future. 245 However, the negotiation of an
"open skies" cargo agreement is clearly a move in the direction of
a longer term liberalized air passenger agreement between the
United States and the EU.
2. The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement as a Model for a
U.S.-EU "Open Skies" Agreement
The United States and the EU should look to the Nether-
lands Open Skies Agreement 246 as a starting point in their in-
"irreversible trend toward greater liberalization." Views on Change of Air
Rights Vary Widely at ICAO Conference, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Apr. 13, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. In addition, a study has re-
cently concluded that airlines in Southeast Asia, which are among the most
efficient in the world, are having their growth inhibited by the current restric-
tive bilateral framework and would benefit from international liberalization.
Southeast Asian Carriers Feel Threatened by Restrictive Bilaterals, WORLD AIR-
LINE NEWS, Oct. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. Fi-
nally, the Andean Pact nations of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela have had a regional "open skies" agreement in force since 1989, and
recently pledged to continue moving forth in their efforts to integrate Latin
American air travel. Andean Pact Airlines Form New Association to Integrate
Air Travel, WORLD AIRUNE NEWS, Sept. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File. This "open skies" policy, part of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, has led to a 400% increase in air travel since 1989. This increase can be
seen in the proliferation of new companies, services, routes and frequencies
across the five member group. Id. These are all promising signs for further
global liberalization.
243. Goldman & Murphy, supra note 212. The European countries are the
United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. Id.
244. E. U., U.S. Open High-Level Meetings on Multilateral Air Freight Re-
gime, AvIATIoN EuR., Feb. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Trans Library, Air
File.
245. Robert Trautman, U.S. Acts to 'Open' Global Skies, With Europe First,
Router Eur. Community Rep., Jan. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allnws File.
246. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text for a description of the
Netherlands Open Skies Agreement. The Netherlands Open Skies Agreement
incorporates the Netherlands Protocol and the Netherlands Agreement.
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ter-regional negotiations. This agreement would provide an
effective and useful "open skies" model for several reasons.
First, it was negotiated by the United States and the Nether-
lands - a member of the EU. Second, the effects of the Nether-
lands Open Skies Agreement can be studied with respect to the
KLM-Northwest alliance.247 Most importantly, the Nether-
lands Open Skies Agreement is one of the most liberal agree-
ments to date and embodies many of the ideal principles
discussed above. 248 Its liberal provisions on market access, fare
setting, and "doing business" rules would allow U.S. and EU air-
lines to enter new markets and more easily form alliances to
improve efficiency. Its provisions allowing government inter-
vention to prevent monopolies and predatory pricing provide a
safeguard against excessive concentration in the industry that
could potentially result from increased competition.
VI. CONCLUSION
International air transport plays a crucial role in interna-
tional trade and tourism. As this role continues to expand, the
present bilateral framework for the exchange of air traffic rights
is rapidly becoming incapable of accommodating the industry's
evolution. This situation, along with the great expense of time
and financial resources required to negotiate numerous bilateral
agreements, 249 clearly indicates that there is a need for liberali-
zation in the international air transport industry.
The key to any meaningful liberalization lies with the
United States and the EU. To begin this process, the United
States and the EU should conclude an "open skies" air cargo
agreement. As the EU moves toward adopting a common exter-
nal aviation policy, the two parties should negotiate an inter-
regional "open skies" passenger agreement, based on the
Netherlands Open Skies Agreement.250
An "open skies" agreement must include provisions for un-
limited market access, liberal fare setting subject only to anti-
trust or competition laws, and unrestricted capacity. In
addition, the agreement should allow for accession by any like-
247. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text. For a general explana-
tion of the relationship between liberalization and airline alliances, see supra
notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
248. For details of the ideal principles of a liberal air transport agreement,
see supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
250. Netherlands Open Skies Agreement, supra note 73.
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minded state. Implementation of these principles in an agree-
ment between the United States and the EU, and eventually on
a multilateral level, would result in lower fares for consumers
worldwide 251 and help to ensure the continued growth of the
travel and tourism industry.252 In addition, these developments
would strengthen the international air transport industry by in-
creasing the consumption of air transport services. 253
The current regime of bilateral air transport agreements
which governs trade in air services has been solidly in place for
the last half a century. As the 50th anniversary of the Chicago
Convention nears, the international aviation community must
recognize that the current system is outdated and inadequate.
The bilateral system is presently incapable of supporting the
continued expansion and globalization of the international air
transport industry, and must be replaced by a multilateral re-
gime. Only then will it be possible to truly "open" the skies to
free trade in air services.
251. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 24, 99-102 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 25, 242 and accompanying text.
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